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Abstract
A concept of “guessability” is defined for sets of sequences of nat-
urals. Eventually, these sets are thoroughly characterized. To do this,
a nonstandard logic is developed, a logic containing symbols for the
ellipsis as well as for functions without fixed arity.
1 Motivation
Suppose Alice and Bob are playing a game. Alice is reading a fixed sequence,
one entry at a time. Bob is trying to guess whether 0 is in the sequence. He
can revise his guess with each new revealed entry, and he wins if his guesses
converge to the correct answer. He has an obvious strategy: always guess
no, until 0 appears (if ever), then guess yes forever. The set of sequences
containing 0 is guessable.
Suppose, instead, Bob is trying to guess whether Alice’s sequence contains
infinitely many zeroes. We will see there is no strategy, not even if Bob has
unlimited computation power. The set of sequences with infinitely many
zeroes is unguessable.
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A sequence f : N → N is onto if ∀m ∃n f(n) = m. This definition uses
nested quantifiers: quantifiers appear in the scope of other quantifiers. Is
it possible to give an alternate definition without nested quantifiers? The
answer is “no”, but how to prove it? We will give a proof of a very strong
negative answer, strong in the sense that nested quantifiers cannot be elim-
inated even in an extremely powerful language. Of course, the technique
generalizes to a wide class of sets of sequences, not just the onto sequences.
2 Basics
Let NN be the set of sequences f : N → N, and let N<N be the set of finite
sequences.
Definition 1. A function G : N<N → {0, 1} guesses (and is a guesser for) a
set S ⊆ NN if for every f : N→ N, there exists some m > 0 such that for all
n > m,
G(f(0), . . . , f(n)) =
{
1, if f ∈ S;
0, if f 6∈ S.
A set S ⊆ NN is guessable if it has a guesser.
The next test is very useful for showing nonguessability, though its con-
verse is not true.
Theorem 1. Let S ⊆ NN. Suppose that, for every finite sequence g ∈ N<N,
there are sequences g1, g2 ∈ N
N extending g with g1 ∈ S and g2 6∈ S. Then S
is nonguessable.
Proof. Suppose S has a guesser G. I will define a sequence f : N → N
such that G(f(0), . . . , f(n)) fails to converge, which violates the definition of
guesser.
Clearly S 6= ∅, so let s1 : N → N be some sequence in S. By definition
of guesser, we can find some x1 such that G(s1(0), . . . , s1(x1)) = 1. Let
f(0) = s1(0), . . . , f(x1) = s1(x1).
Inductively, suppose x1 < · · · < xk and f(0), . . . , f(xk) are defined such
that G(f(0), . . . , f(xi)) ≡ i (mod 2) for i = 1, . . . , k. By the theorem’s hy-
pothesis, we can find some sk+1 : N → N, extending the finite sequence
(f(0), . . . , f(xk)), such that sk+1 is in S iff k+1 ≡ 1 (mod2). By definition of
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guesser, find xk+1 > xk such that G(sk+1(0), . . . , sk+1(xk+1)) ≡ k+1 (mod 2).
Let f(xk + 1) = sk+1(xk + 1), . . . , f(xk+1) = sk+1(xk+1).
This defines sequences f : N → N and x1 < x2 < · · · with the property
that G(f(0), . . . , f(xi)) ≡ i (mod 2) for every i > 0. This contradicts that
G(f(0), . . . , f(n)) is supposed to converge.
Using the above test, we can immediately confirm, for example, the set
of sequences containing infinitely many zeroes is nonguessable, as is the set
of onto sequences.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 is constructive up to certain choices. Starting with a
set S satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 1 and naively trying to guess it,
and being systematic in the choices from the proof, can lead to the creation of
a concrete sequence which thwarts the naive guessing attempt. In an informal
sense, it should be especially difficult for someone not in the know to guess
whether the resulting sequence lies in S. And the more sophisticated the
futile guessing attempt, the more difficult the resulting sequence becomes.
For some explicit examples, see sequences A082691, A182659, and A182660
in Sloane’s OEIS [5].
Tsaban and Zdomskyy also briefly mention a somewhat similar notion of
guessable sets in their paper [6].
3 A Logic for Ellipses
Because guessers are functions which do not have “arity” in the usual sense,
instead being defined on the whole space N<N of finite sequences, and since we
care so much about expressions like G(f(0), . . . , f(n)), we will extend logic
to mesh better with these sorts of expressions. I assume familiarity with
basic first-order logic, which Enderton [2] has written about extensively, as
has Bilaniuk [1].
Definition 2. A language with ellipses is a standard language of first-order
logic, with a constant symbol 0, together with a set of function symbols of
arity N<N and a special logical symbol · · ·x for every variable x.
To avoid confusion, we will use · · ·x for the syntactical symbol and . . . for
meta-ellipses. For example, G(s(0), . . . , s(2)) is a meta-abbreviation for
G(s(0), s(1), s(2)),
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different than G(s(0), · · ·x , s(2)) which has no counterpart in classical logic.
Definition 3. If L is a language with ellipses, then the terms of L (and
their free variables) are defined inductively:
1. For any variable x, x is a term and FV (x) = {x}.
2. For any constant symbol c, c is a term and FV (c) = ∅.
3. If f is a function symbol of arity n or arity N<N, and t1, . . . , tn are
terms, then f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term with free vars FV (t1)∪· · ·∪FV (tn).
4. If G is an N<N-ary function symbol, and u, v are terms, and x is a
variable, then G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v)) is a term with free variables
(FV (u)\{x}) ∪ FV (v).
The well-formed formulas of L are defined as usual from these terms. Term
substitution is defined by the usual induction with two new cases:
• If y 6= x then
G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))(y|t) = G(u(y|t)(0), · · ·x , u(y|t)(v(y|t))).
• G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))(x|t) = G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v(x|t))).
Amodel for a language with ellipses L is a model M for the classical part
of L , together with a function GM : M<N → M for each N<N-ary function
symbol G in L . However, defining how an arbitrary model evaluates terms
is difficult. We will only be interested in one very specific family of models,
where there is no trouble evaluating terms.
Definition 4. The following models lie at the heart of all later results.
• Lmax is the language with ellipses which contains a constant symbol
n for every n ∈ N, an n-ary function symbol w˜ for every function
w : Nn → N (n > 0), an n-ary predicate symbol p˜ for every subset
p ⊆ Nn (n > 0), an N<N-ary function symbol G˜ for every function
G : N<N → N, and one additional unary function symbol f .
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• For every function f : N → N, Mf is the model for the language
Lmax with universe N, which interprets n as n for every n, w˜ as w
for every w : Nn → N, p˜ as p for every p ⊆ Nn, and G˜ as G for every
G : N<N → N, and which interprets f as f .
If n ∈ N then n¯ denotes the numeral n of n.
Definition 5. Let f : N → N. The semantics of Mf are defined as follows.
Let s be any assignment from the variables to N.
• (Mf , s) interprets terms t into naturals t
Mf ,s, or ts if there is no ambi-
guity, according to the usual inductive definition, with one new case:
– If u, v are terms and x is a variable and G is an N<N-ary function
symbol, then
G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))
s = GMf (u(x|0)s, . . . , u (x |vs )
s
) .
• For example, the interpretation of G˜(f(x)(0), · · ·x , f(x)(99)) is
G(f(0), . . . , f(99)),
while the interpretation of G˜(f(x)(0), · · ·x , f(x)(f(y))) is
G(f(0), . . . , f(f(ys))).
• From here, the remaining semantics of Mf are defined as usual.
In classical logic, every term with no free variables has the property that
its interpretation in any model depends only on finitely many values of the
interpretations of the function symbols in that model. For example, the
interpretation of 5 + (2 · 3) depends only on one value of · and one value of
+. Similar properties are true of our Mf models.
Lemma 2. Suppose u is a term with no free variables, and c is a constant
symbol. For any f : N → N, Mf |= u = c iff there is some k such that
whenever g : N → N extends (f(0), . . . , f(k)), Mg |= u = c and to check
whether Mg |= u = c using the inductive definition of semantics for Mg, it
is not necessary to query g(i) for any i > k.
Proof. (⇒) Induction on complexity of u.
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• Since u has no free variables, u cannot be a variable. If u is a constant
symbol, the lemma is trivial.
• Suppose that u is h(u1, . . . , un) for some n-ary (or N
<N-ary) function
symbol h other than f , and some terms u1, . . . , un with no free variables.
If Mf |= h(u1, . . . , un) = c, then there are a1, . . . , an ∈ N such that
hMf (a1, . . . , an) = c
Mf and Mf |= ui = a¯i for i = 1, . . . , n. Since a¯i
is a constant symbol, by induction find k1, . . . , kn such that for any
i = 1, . . . , n and any g : N → N with g(0) = f(0), . . . , g(ki) = f(ki),
Mg |= ui = a¯i, and checking this by definition of semantics does not
require querying g(j) for any j > ai. Then k = max{k1, . . . , kn} works
(using the fact hMg does not depend on g since h is not f).
• Next, suppose u is f(v) where v is a term with no free variables. If
Mf |= f(v) = c then there iss a ∈ N such that f(a) = c
Mf and
Mf |= v = a¯. Since a¯ is a constant symbol, by induction find k0 such
that whenever g(0) = f(0), . . . , g(k0) = f(k0), then Mg |= v = a¯, and
checking Mg |= v = a¯ does not require querying g(i) for any i > k0.
Let k = max{k0, a}. Suppose g(0) = f(0), . . . , g(k) = f(k). Then
f(v)Mg = fMg(vMg) = g(a) = f(a) = cMf . So Mg |= f(v) = c, and to
check so, we only had to query g(a) in addition to any queries we had
to make to check Mg |= v = a¯, so we did not have to query g(i) for any
i > k.
• Finally, suppose u is G(v(0), · · ·x , v(w)) where v, w are terms, x is a
variable, FV (w) = ∅, FV (v) ⊆ {x}, and G is an N<N-ary function
symbol. If Mf |= G(v(0), · · ·x , v(w)) = c then
GMf
(
v(x|0)Mf , . . . , v
(
x
∣∣∣wMf )Mf) = cMf .
Since Mf |= w = wMf , find some number k−1 such that whenever
g extends (f(0), ..., f(k−1)), Mg |= w = wMf and checking so does
not require queries beyond g(k−1). Since Mf |= v(x|i) = v(x|i) for
i = 0, . . . , wMf , find k0, . . . , kwMf such that for each i = 0, . . . , w
Mf ,
if g(0) = f(0), . . . , g(ki) = f(ki) then Mg |= v(x|i) = v(x|i) can be
confirmed without querying g beyond g(ki).
Let k = max{k−1, k0, . . . , kwMf }. Suppose g(0) = f(0), . . . , g(k) =
f(k). Then Mg |= w = wMf , so w
Mg = wMf . Similarly v(x|i)Mg =
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v(x|i)Mf for i = 0, . . . , wMf . And GMg = GMf . It follows that
Mg |= G(v(0), · · ·x , v(w)) = c,
and checking so does not require any queries to g(j) for any j > k.
(⇐) Suppose there is some k so that whenever g extends (f(0), . . . , f(k))
then Mg |= u = c. In particular, f itself extends (f(0), . . . , f(k)), so Mf |=
u = c.
Corollary 3. Let φ be a quantifier-free sentence. For any f : N→ N, Mf |=
φ iff there is some k such that for every g : N→ N extending (f(0), . . . , f(k)),
Mg |= φ, and in checking Mg |= φ by the inductive definition of semantics,
we never need to query g(i) for any i > k.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ.
• Suppose φ is u = v for terms u, v with no free variables. Assume Mf |=
u = v. Then Mf |= u = uMf and Mf |= v = uMf . By Lemma 2, find
k big enough that whenever g(0) = f(0), . . . , g(k) = f(k), then Mg |=
u = uMf and Mg |= v = uMf and both facts can be confirmed without
querying g beyond g(k). For any such g, Mg |= u = v, verifiable with
no additional g-queries. The converse is trivial.
• Next, suppose φ is p˜(u1, . . . , un) for an n-ary predicate symbol p˜ and
terms u1, . . . , un with no free variables. Then φ is equivalent (in every
M·) to g˜(u1, . . . , un) = 1 where g is the characteristic function of p, so
we are done by the previous case.
• Suppose φ is φ1∧φ2. Assume Mf |= φ. Inductively, find k1 and k2 such
that if g extends (f(0), . . . , f(ki)) then Mg |= φi is verifiable with no g-
queries beyond g(ki). Then any g extending (f(0), . . . , f(max{k1, k2}))
has Mg |= φ, verifiable without querying beyond g(max{k1, k2}). The
converse is trivial.
• The cases of other propositional connectives are similar.
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If s is an assignment from the variables of a language onto the universe of
the language, and if x is a variable, and n is a number, then s(x|n) denotes the
assignment which is identical to s except that it maps x to n. Similarly if a
model is understood by context and c is a constant symbol then s(x|c) denotes
the assignment identical to s except that it maps x to the interpretation of
c in the model.
Lemma 4. (The Weak Substitution Lemma) For a formula φ, an assignment
s, and a constant symbol c, and for any f : N → N, Mf |= φ[s(x|cs)] iff
Mf |= φ(x|c)[s].
Proof. By the inductive argument used to prove the full Substitution Lemma
in classical logic, most of which we omit. But there are tricky new cases for
our new terms.
Claim: For any terms u, v, constant symbol c, variables x 6= y, and
assignment s,
G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))(y|c)
s = G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))
s(y|c).
The details are (using the induction hypothesis repeatedly) as follows:
G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))(y|c)
s = G (u(y|c)(0), · · ·x , u(y|c)(v(y|c)))
s
= GMf
(
u(y|c)(x|0)s, . . . , u(y|c)
(
x
∣∣∣v(y|c)s)s)
= GMf
(
u(x|0)s(y|c), . . . , u
(
x
∣∣∣vs(y|c))s(y|c))
= G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))
s(y|c).
Claim: For any terms u, v, constant symbol c, and variable x and as-
signment s,
G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))(x|c)
s = G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))
s(x|c).
Using the induction hypothesis repeatedly:
G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))(x|c)
s = G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v(x|c)))
s
= GMf
(
u(x|0)s, . . . , u
(
x
∣∣∣v(x|c)s)s)
= GMf
(
u(x|0)s, . . . , u
(
x
∣∣∣vs(x|c))s)
= GMf
(
u(x|0)s(x|c), . . . , u
(
x
∣∣∣vs(x|c))s(x|c))
= G(u(0), · · ·x , u(v))
s(x|c).
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The next to last equation is justified because the terms whose “exponents”
are changed do not depend on x.
A full Substitution Lemma is also true, but it requires a nonclassical
definition of substitutable, which would take us too far afield.
4 Guessability and Quantifiers
Definition 6. Let S ⊆ NN be a set of sequences. Let φ be a sentence in
Lmax. We say that φ defines S if, for every f : N→ N, Mf |= φ iff f ∈ S.
Theorem 5. A set S ⊆ NN is guessable if and only if it is defined by some
sentence ∀x ∃y φ and also by some sentence ∃x ∀y ψ, where φ and ψ are
quantifier-free.
We divide the proof of the theorem above into a sequence of lemmata.
Lemma 6. Suppose S ⊆ NN is guessable. Then S is defined by some sentence
∃x ∀y φ and also by some sentence ∀x ∃y ψ, where φ and ψ are quantifier-free.
Proof. Let G be a guesser for S. For any f : N → N, f ∈ S if and only if
G(f(0), . . . , f(n)) = 1 for all n sufficiently large. Therefore S is defined by
∃x ∀y ((y > x)→ G˜(f(z)(0), · · ·z , f(z)(y)) = 1),
where “y > x” is shorthand for >˜(y, x). Similarly, S is also defined by
∀x ∃y ((y > x) ∧ G˜(f(z)(0), · · ·z , f(z)(y)) = 1).
We will prove the converse of Lemma 6 shortly. To that end, a piece of
technical machinery is needed.
Definition 7. A set S ⊆ NN is overguessable if there is a function µ : N<N →
N ∪ {∞} such that:
1. For every f ∈ S, µ(f(0), . . . , f(n)) is eventually bounded by a finite
number.
2. For every f 6∈ S, µ(f(0), . . . , f(n))→∞ as n→∞.
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Lemma 7. Suppose S ⊆ NN is defined by the sentence ∃x ∀y φ where φ is
quantifier-free. Then S is overguessable.
Proof. Given a tuple (n0, . . . , nk), define µ(n0, . . . , nk) as follows. Let h :
N → N be defined by h(i) = ni if i ≤ k, h(i) = 0 otherwise. Given a pair
(a, b) ∈ N2, consider the sentence φ(x, y|a¯, b¯). Attempt to check whether
Mh |= φ(x, y|a¯, b¯), using the inductive definition of the semantics of Mh.
If, in so doing, you must query h(i) for some i > k, say that the attempt
failed. Otherwise, say the attempt succeeded. If the attempt failed, or if
Mh |= φ(x, y|a¯, b¯), then say that (a, b) is nice.
Call a number a very nice if (a, b) is nice for every b. If there is any
very nice number, then let µ(n0, . . . , nk) be the smallest very nice number.
Otherwise let µ(n0, . . . , nk) =∞.
I claim the above µ witnesses that S is overguessable.
First, suppose f ∈ S. Since S is defined by ∃x ∀y φ, Mf |= ∃x ∀y φ. By
the Weak Substitution Lemma, for some a, Mf |= φ(x, y|a¯, b¯) for every b.
When we attempt to check whether Mh |= φ(x, y|a¯, b¯) in the definition of
µ(f(0), . . . , f(k)), if the attempt succeeds, then Mh |= φ(x, y|a¯, b¯) because
Mf |= φ(x, y|a¯, b¯) and we never had to look at the part of h which disagrees
with f . So (a, b) is nice for every b, so a is very nice, so µ(f(0), . . . , f(k)) is
bounded by a.
Next, suppose f 6∈ S. Let a ∈ N, I claim µ(f(0), ..., f(n)) 6= a for all n
sufficiently large. Since f 6∈ S, Mf 6|= ∃x ∀y φ. By the Weak Substitution
Lemma, there is some b such that Mf 6|= φ(x, y|a¯, b¯). Since φ is quantifier-
free, we invoke Corollary 3 on ¬φ(x, y|a¯, b¯) and find k such that Mg 6|=
φ(x, y|a¯, b¯) whenever g extends (f(0), . . . , f(k)), and, to check whether Mg |=
φ(x, y|a¯, b¯), we do not need to query g(i) for i > k. Then, in the definition of
µ(f(0), . . . , f(k)), for pair (a, b), the attempt succeeds and Mh 6|= φ(x, y|a¯, b¯),
so (a, b) is not nice, so a is not very nice, so µ(f(0), . . . , f(k)) 6= a, in fact,
µ(f(0), . . . , f(j)) 6= a for all j ≥ k. By arbitrariness of a, µ(f(0), ..., f(n))→
∞.
Lemma 8. Suppose a set S ⊆ NN is defined by some sentence ∀x ∃y φ and
also by some sentence ∃x ∀y ψ, where φ and ψ are quantifier-free. Then S is
guessable.
Proof. By Lemma 7, find µ : N<N → N∪{∞} which overguesses S. And since
Sc is defined by ∃x ∀y ¬φ, use Lemma 7 again to find ν : N<N → N ∪ {∞}
which overguesses Sc.
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Define G : N<N → {0, 1} by saying G(n0, . . . , nk) = 1 if µ(n0, . . . , nk) ≤
ν(n0, . . . , nk) and 0 otherwise. If f ∈ S then µ(f(0), . . . , f(k)) is eventually
bounded by a finite number and ν(f(0), . . . , f(k))→∞, so G(f(0), . . . , f(k))
converges to 1. The other case is similar.
Combining Lemmata 6 and 8 proves Theorem 5.
Proposition 9. If S ⊂ NN is overguessable, then it is defined by some
sentence ∃x∀yφ with φ quantifier-free.
Proof. Suppose S is overguessed by µ : N<N → N∪{∞}. Define µ′ : NN → N
by saying µ′(n) = µ(n) + 1 if µ(n) 6=∞, µ′(n) = 0 if µ(n) = ∞. If f : N →
N, then f ∈ S if and only if the sequence µ(f(0), . . . , f(n)) is eventually
bounded by some finite number. This is true if and only if µ′(f(0), . . . , f(n))
is eventually bounded by some finite number and eventually nonzero. This
latter equivalence can be expressed by
∃m1 ∃m2 ∀m3 ((m3 > m2)→ (0 < µ
′(f(0), . . . , f(m3)) < m1)).
Let d : N→ N2 be any onto map from N to N2. Write d(n) = (d1(n), d2(n)),
thus defining two functions d1, d2 : N → N. Then the above formula is
equivalent to
∃m ∀m3 ((m3 > d2(m))→ (0 < µ
′(f(0), . . . , f(m3)) < d1(m))).
This can be formalized in Lmax, providing a sentence ∃x ∀y φ which defines
S, with φ quantifier-free.
Example 10. Every countable subset of NN is overguessable.
Proof. Let S ⊆ NN be countable. Define g : N2 → N by saying g(m,n) =
hm(n) where hm is the mth element of S. Then S is defined by
∃x ∀y g˜(x, y) = f(y).
By Lemma 7, S is overguessable.
Remark 2. Guessable and overguessable sets of sequences are analogous to
computable and computably enumerable sets of naturals, respectively. One
shows that ∆1 sets (in a much weaker logical setting than Lmax) of naturals
are computable by showing that they and their complements are c.e. by
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using the characterization of c.e. sets as sets which are Σ1-definable (in the
weaker setting). By comparison, I have shown that ∆2 sets of sequences (in
a very strong logical setting) are guessable by showing that they and their
complements are overguessable by using the characterization of overguessable
sets as Σ2-definable (in the stronger setting). These analogous phenomena in
computability theory have been written about by Rogers [3], Enderton [2],
Bilaniuk [1], and many other authors.
We will elaborate more on Remark 2 in Section 5.
Lemma 11. Suppose S ⊆ NN is definable by a sentence ∀x ∃y φ where φ is
quantifier-free. If S is countable then S is guessable.
Proof. Suppose S is countable. In the proof of Example 10, we showed S is
definable by a sentence ∃x ∀y ψ where ψ is quantifier-free. By Theorem 5, S
is guessable.
Example 12. There are uncountably many permutations of N.
Proof. A function f : N→ N is a permutation iff
∀m1 ∀m2 ∃n ((f(m1) = f(m2)→ m1 = m2) ∧ f(n) = m2).
By appropriately coding 〈m1, m2〉, the set S of permutations is defined by a
sentence ∀x ∃y φ where φ is quantifier-free.
Permutations are not guessable. If G were a permutation-guesser, it
would diverge on the following sequence. Let f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, and so
on until G(f(0), . . . , f(k1)) = 1 (this must happen since G would converge
to 1 if we kept going forever). Then skip a number, f(k1 + 1) = k1 + 2,
f(k1 + 2) = k1 + 3, and keep going until G(f(0), . . . , f(k2)) = 0. Then fill in
the gap, f(k2+1) = k1+1, and resume where we left off, f(k2+2) = k2+2,
and so on until G(f(0), . . . , f(k3)) = 1. This process shows permutations are
unguessable.
By Lemma 11, S is uncountable.
Example 13. (Cantor) There are uncountably many real numbers.
Proof. Consider the set A of numbers in the interval (0, 1) which have in-
finitely many 5s in their decimal expansions. There is an obvious bijection
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between A and the set S of sequences f : N → {0, 9} such that f(n) = 5
infinitely often. This set S is defined by
∀x ∃y ((y > x) ∧ f(y) = 5 ∧ f(x) ≥ 0 ∧ f(x) ≤ 9).
By Lemma 11, if S is countable then it is guessable. But it is not: if G were
a guesser for S, then we could define a sequence on whose initial segments G
does not converge. Namely, let f(0) = . . . = f(xk) = 0 where xk is big enough
that G(f(0), ..., f(xk)) = 0, and then let f(xk + 1) = · · · = f(xk+1) = 5,
where xk+1 > xk is big enough that G(f(0), ..., f(xk+1)) = 1. And so on,
alternating, forever. This shows S is not guessable, so S is not countable, so
A is uncountable, so R is uncountable.
Lemma 14. If S ⊆ NN is definable by a sentence φ without nested quantifiers
(that is, no quantifier appearing in the scope of another), then S is guessable.
Proof. If so, then φ is a propositional combination of quantifier-free sentences
and sentences of the form ∀xφ0 and ∃xφ1 where φ0, φ1 are quantifier-free.
The sets defined by these component sentences are guessable by Theorem 5.
Clearly guessable sets are closed under union, intersection, and complement,
so S itself is guessable.
Example 15. The definition of onto functions cannot be simplified to get
rid of nested quantifiers, not even with the full power of Lmax.
Proof. By Lemma 14 and the fact the set of onto functions is not guessable,
see Theorem 1.
5 Descriptive Set Theory
In this section we will elaborate further on Remark 2. In descriptive set
theory, NN is endowed with the topology whose basic open sets are those sets
of the form
{f ∈ NN : f extends f0}
where f0 ∈ N
<N. Since N<N is countable, NN is second countable in the sense
of basic topology. A set is called Gδ if it is a countable intersection of open
sets, and Fσ if it is a countable union of closed sets. A set is ∆
0
2 if it is
both Gδ and Fσ (equivalently, if it and its complement are both Gδ). This
∆02 is one of the levels of the Borel hierarchy which many authors, including
Moschovakis [4], have written about.
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Theorem 16. Let S ⊆ NN. Then S is guessable if and only if S is ∆02.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose S is guessable. By Lemma 6, S is defined by a sentence
∀x ∃y φ where φ is quantifier-free. For every i, j ∈ N, let Si ⊆ N
N be the set
defined by ∃y φ(x|i) and let Tij ⊆ N
N be the set defined by φ(x, y|i, j). It
follows from Corollary 3 that each Tij is open. Each Si = ∪jTij , so each Si is
open. Since S = ∩iSi, S is Gδ. Since S
c is also guessable, identical reasoning
shows Sc is Gδ, so S is ∆
0
2.
(⇐) Suppose S is∆02. Write S = ∩i∈NSi where each Si is open. By second
countability, write Si = ∪j∈NTij where each Tij is basic open. By the nature
of basic open sets of NN, there are T 0ij ∈ N
<N such that each Tij is exactly
the set of infinite extensions of T 0ij . Let τ : N
<N → N be defined by saying
τ(i, j, x0, . . . , xk) = 1 if (x0, . . . , xk) = T
0
ij , τ is 0 everywhere else. Define
ℓ : N2 → N by letting ℓ(i, j) be the length of T 0ij . Then for any f : N→ N, f
extends T 0ij if and only if τ(i, j, f(0), . . . , f(ℓ(i, j))) = 1. Thus, f ∈ S if and
only if
∀i ∃j τ(i, j, f(0), . . . , f(ℓ(i, j))) = 1.
This can be formalized in Lmax. By dual reasoning applied to S
c, S can
also be defined by some ∃i ∀j φ where φ is quantifier-free. By Theorem 5, S
is guessable.
6 Addendum
In January 2012, we learned that the notion of guessability was introduced
some time ago in the PhD dissertation of William W. Wadge [7]. Instead
of considering guesser functions, Wadge considered guesser sets, calling a
subset S ⊆ NN guessable if there are disjoint sets U,W ⊆ N<N such that
for every sequence f , f ∈ S iff f |k ∈ U for all but finitely many k, and
f 6∈ S iff f |k ∈ W for all but finitely many k. This is clearly equivalent
to our definition. Wadge gave a game-theoretical proof that guessability is
equivalent to being ∆02 (our Theorem 16) and then used this fact to show
a special case, for ∆02 sets, of what is now known as Wadge’s lemma, an
important result about Wadge degrees studied by descriptive set theorists.
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